In her book, Tracy
Sharpley-Whiting (1998) appraises the feminist arguments about Frantz Fanon’s
work. In sum, her argument is that Fanon faces the cliché of being “damned if
you do, damned if you don’t”, because (as she shows) he could be accused of sexism
whether or not he wrote explicitly about women’s marginalization (1998, p.74).
In this essay, I will explore Sharpley-Whiting’s main arguments and relate
these discussions to developments in intersectional feminism.
The author’s main defense
of Fanon’s work is that Fanon’s words have been misread or misinterpreted as
generalizations. Sharpley-Whiting, in a few occasions makes the argument that
Fanon’s psychoanalysis of women of colour was an analysis of those who had
internalized racism, not all women of colour (1998, p.36). For instance, she
highlights that Capecia, who is the focus of many feminists’ critiques of
Fanon, was “duped” – thus, she argues that Fanon studied Capecia as an example
of the type of coloured woman he was speaking about, not as an example of all
women of colour (1998, p. 36, p. 38 & p. 42).
In a further analysis of
the arguments which frame Fanon as a misogynist, based on his discussion of
Capecia, Sharpley-Whiting elucidates how Fanon was accurate in his analysis.
Instead of focusing on Fanon’s choice to interrogate the writing of a black
woman, the author argues that instead we should interrogate Fanon’s argument.
Here, she argues that the crux of Fanon’s critique is that, on a psychological
level, Capecia shows the internalization of racism by a black woman. The claim
of blackfemmephobia charged against Capecia is evidenced in Sharpley-Whiting’s
discussion of how she describes Lucia, but also in other instances where
Capecia talks about herself (1998, p. 43).
The second main critique
Sharpley-Whiting (1998) makes of feminist criticisms of Fanon looks at the
claim of myth-making, in regards to women’s roles in the Algerian revolution,
particularly in A Dying Colonialism. According to Helie-Lucas, Fanon’s framing
of the role of women in the Algerian revolution amounts to myth-making because
he overstates its impact in fundamentally shifting the woman’s role in the
Algerian society (1998, p. 57). Here, it is argued that gender hierarchies
still existed within the liberation struggle, even though women were included.
This critique also premised on the fact that after the liberation struggle,
women were “shuttled back into the kitchen” (1998, p. 57).
Another important point
made by Algerian feminists is that the level of autonomy women gained within
the struggle was limited (more so than Fanon acknowledged). For instance, it is
argued that the coercive element of women using the veil in order to further
the struggle for liberation has often been overlooked (1998, p. 61). Such
arguments are tied to the impact that the struggle for a national culture
played in the development of post-independence Algeria. Particularly, it is
highlighted that women in Algeria faced the burden of having to be the
custodians of national culture after independence (1998, p. 58). Helie-Lucas
(in Sharpley-Whiting: 1998, p. 59) writes,
Women are supposed to
raise sons in the faith and traditional moral standards and to teach the
language of the forefathers. Women should be bound by tradition, while men had
some access to modernity.
For these reasons, it is
argued that women’s roles have not been changed by the revolution: rather that
“women were used by the revolution as tools” (el-Saadawi in Sharpley-Whiting:
1998, p. 59). Crucial here, is the acknowledgement that participation in a
liberation struggle does not, by default, win women’s rights (despite the
transformations in gender roles which occur during the struggle) (Gadant in
Sharpley-Whiting: 1998, p. 21).
In my view,
Sharpley-Whiting does not make a strong enough case against the arguments
presented. However, I agree with her that Fanon is “at most, optimistic”.
Although I think the arguments citing Fanon’s “myth-making” deserve merit,
given that he died before he could analyze the events of post-independence
Algeria, I also think that his interpretation of the Algerian independence
moment is a fair assessment of what he witnessed at the time.
I find the claim of
myth-making important, on the basis that the claim evaluates the impact of
Fanon’s writing in perceptions of the Algerian war (countering
misrepresentations). However, I do not think that the claim of myth-making can
be credibly used as evidence of Fanon’s sexism. The matter of Fanon being
sexist, in my view, is a separate matter to that of how his work has
(debatably) misrepresented a historical narrative. In addition, in line with
Sharpley-Whiting (1998, p. 73), I think it is important to separate Fanon’s
intention - which was in actual fact, not to present a “definitive, complete
historical picture on the Algerian” revolution - with the impact of his work, which I think is
influenced by other people (mis)reading it as a historical account of the war.
Another important theme
in Sharpley-Whiting’s analysis is that of Fanon as Feminist. At the core of
this issue is whether or not Fanon can be categorized as a feminist. The author
responds that it is more important to look at the “feminist dimensions” of
Fanon’s work, because of the contestations about the definitions of feminism
(1998, p.24). For me, one of the most important dimensions of feminism is the
recognition of women’s (or people’s) autonomy and agency. Based on
Sharpley-Whiting’s work, I would now like to explore Fanon’s contributions in
relation to intersectional feminism.
One of the strengths of
Fanon’s work, as pointed out by Sharpley-Whiting, is his recognition of
gender-based hierarchies (1998, p. 33 & p.71). In addition however, his
work also shows a nuanced recognition of women’s agency. The author shows that
in his evaluation of Capecia, he recognizes her agency, more so than his
criticizers (ironically), who frame her as being under economic duress (1998,
p. 39). In his discussion of the Algerian family, his analysis of the
transformation in traditional modes of behaviour also emphasizes his
understanding of agency. In his criticism of colonial feminism, he again shows
an understanding of how this discourse is re-inscribing the idea that Algerian
women lack agency (1998, p. 68). In his arguments, it is clear that Fanon
advocates for the recognition of every person as a full human being. Hence, his
work is crucial for intersectional feminists who are working towards a new
humanity/humanism: a feminism which moves beyond the liberation of (white,
middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual) women.
Additionally, I also
believe that Fanon’s contributions to psychiatry should be modeled into
intersectional feminist praxis. One of the criticisms of contemporary feminism
is that it has failed to acknowledge the plight of people with mental illnesses
or disabilities. As such, in recent times, ableism within the feminist movement
has become a talking point (Whitestone: 2015). As other texts have shown, Fanon
was committed to psychiatric care which recognized the sociogenic factors of
illness – meaning that he did not view his patients as problem-people and
rather, emphasized the role of structural oppression in mental illness. Here,
we see that based on his understanding of structural oppression, Fanon’s work
fits well into intersectional feminism, especially since, as advocates such as
Blahovec (2015) have stated, feminism and disability rights are two sides of
the same coin.
Reference list:
Blahovec, S., 2014. 4
Reasons That Feminism and Disability Rights Are Two Sides of the Same
Coin. Accessed online 20 May 2015 from
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sarah-blahovec/four-reasons-that-feminis_b_6160774.html
Sharpley-Whiting, T.
1998, Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Whitestone, S. 2015, How
Mainstream Feminism Continues to Perpetuate Ableism (And How We Can Change
That). Accessed online 20 May 2015 from
http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/how-feminism-perpetuates-ableism
