For more than a decade, the construction of politics has been
determined within the logic of exception and sovereignty. Although at the end
of the twentieth century the Balkan conflict already heralded a logic of war,
following September 11th, the early 2000s were marked by terror, creating a
foundation where, following the proposals of Carl Schmitt, the specific
difference from which to determine the political was to be found once more in
the figure of the enemy.
Showing posts with label Jacques Rancière. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jacques Rancière. Show all posts
Saturday, 13 September 2014
Occupying Space: The Battle for Politics
Helena
Chávez Mac Gregor, Johannesburg Workshop in Theory & Criticism
Friday, 13 June 2014
Dis/placing political illiteracy: the politics of intellectual equality in a South African shack-dwellers’ movement
Anna Selmeczi, Interface
This paper starts out
with the claim that the contemporary spatio-political order of the South African “world class” city
is conditional upon constructing many
lives as superfluous and disposable. This construction partly rests on the inherited topography of apartheid displacement
which continues to push the poor black
majority into zones of invisibility and inaudibility. Beyond this physical distancing, the production and abandonment
of surplus people also depends on
rendering them as improper political subjects. In the prevailing political discourse, poor people’s struggles are
deemed less than political through
notions such as the idea that all protest is related to the pace of “service delivery” or accusations of violence,
as well as often explicit characterizations of dissenting people as ignorant.
Tuesday, 1 October 2013
Tuesday, 28 May 2013
Thursday, 31 January 2013
The People Are Not a Brutal and Ignorant Mass
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| Jacques Rancière |
The People Are Not a Brutal and Ignorant Mass
Not a day goes by without the risks of populism being denounced on all sides. But it is not so easy to grasp what the word denotes. What is a populist? Despite various fluctuations of meaning, the dominant discourse seems to characterize it in terms of three essential features: a style of speech addressed directly to the people, bypassing representatives and dignitaries; the assertion that governments and ruling elites are more concerned with feathering their own nest than with the public interest; a rhetoric of identity that expresses fear and rejection of foreigners.
Not a day goes by without the risks of populism being denounced on all sides. But it is not so easy to grasp what the word denotes. What is a populist? Despite various fluctuations of meaning, the dominant discourse seems to characterize it in terms of three essential features: a style of speech addressed directly to the people, bypassing representatives and dignitaries; the assertion that governments and ruling elites are more concerned with feathering their own nest than with the public interest; a rhetoric of identity that expresses fear and rejection of foreigners.
Sunday, 4 November 2012
Jacques Rancière on the 'evil third party'
Why has the
philosophy of the intelligentsia or activists always needed to blame some evil third
party (petty bourgeoisie, ideologist or master thinker) for the shadows and
obscurities that get in the way of the harmonious relationship between their
own self-consciousness and the self-identity of their popular objects of study?
Was this evil party contrived to spirit away another more fearsome threat: that
of seeing the thinkers of the night invade the territory of
philosophy?
- Jacques Rancière, Introduction to Proletarian Nights
Friday, 19 October 2012
Abahlali’s Vocal Politics of Proximity: Speaking, Suffering and Political Subjectivization
by Anna Selmeczi, October 2012
Using as its point of departure the claim that today the
urban is the main site for the abandonment of superfluous people, this article
explores the emancipatory politics of the South African shack-dwellers’
movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo. Based on a notion of political
subjectivization as the appropriation of excess freedom, I argue that Abahlali
disrupt the order of the ‘world-class city’ when they expose the contradiction
between the democratic inscriptions of equality and the lethal segmentation of
the urban order. In articulating their living conditions as the unjustified
breach of the promise of ‘a better life’, the shack-dwellers prove their equality and thus emerge as
political subjects. As the article argues, at the centre of this process is a
political practice of speaking and listening that is driven by the imperative
to reverse the distancing and delaying practices of an order that abandons them
by remaining physically, experientially and cognitively proximate to the
experiences of life in the shantytown.
Friday, 17 August 2012
Communists without communism?
by Jacques
Rancière, 2010
Firstly
communism is not an ideal. It is an actual form of life. While
democracy means freedom and equality only represented in the separate
form of law and state, communism is their sensory reality, embedded
in the forms of an existing common world.
Monday, 2 July 2012
From the Cult of the People to the Cult of Rancière
A radical social historian as well as philosopher, Jacques Rancière has spent many years rescuing vivid fragments of proletarian life and thought from the vested interests that claim to speak for them. But in thwarting the instrumentality of intellectuals, he also risks obscuring the material he cherishes and the energies it carries – write Anthony Iles and Tom Roberts in Mute Magazine
Wednesday, 18 April 2012
“We are the people who do not count”: Thinking the disruption of the biopolitics of abandonment
“We are the people who do not count”: Thinking the disruption of the biopolitics of abandonment
PhD Thesis by Anna Selmeczi, April 2012
Starting from the observation that today the urban emerges as the main site for the production and abandonment of surplus life – a life whose capacities cannot be rendered useful and is therefore not to be fostered – in this thesis I offer a re-politicized reading of abandonment by drawing on my field-research with the largest South African shack-dwellers’ movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo. Grounding this re-politicized reading in the problem of excess freedom that emerges on the horizon of governmental rationality between the political inclusion of the surplus population and their obstructive uselessness, I begin the inquiry by asking how the current order of neoliberal urbanism contains the surplus population when the establishment of the educative trusteeship of development is no longer pertinent.
PhD Thesis by Anna Selmeczi, April 2012
Starting from the observation that today the urban emerges as the main site for the production and abandonment of surplus life – a life whose capacities cannot be rendered useful and is therefore not to be fostered – in this thesis I offer a re-politicized reading of abandonment by drawing on my field-research with the largest South African shack-dwellers’ movement, Abahlali baseMjondolo. Grounding this re-politicized reading in the problem of excess freedom that emerges on the horizon of governmental rationality between the political inclusion of the surplus population and their obstructive uselessness, I begin the inquiry by asking how the current order of neoliberal urbanism contains the surplus population when the establishment of the educative trusteeship of development is no longer pertinent.
Friday, 23 March 2012
Politics and aesthetics an interview with Jacques Rancière
Interviewed by Peter Hallward, 2003
For me, democracy isn’t a form of power but the very existence of the political (in so far as politics is distinct from knowing who has the right to occupy power or how power should be occupied), precisely because it defines a paradoxical power – one that doesn’t allow anyone legitimately to claim a place on the basis of his or her competences. Democracy is, first of all, a practice, which means that the very same institutions of power may or may not be accompanied by a democratic life. The same forms of parliamentary powers, the same institutional frameworks can either give rise to a democratic life, that is, a subjectivation of the gap between two ways of counting or accounting for the community, or operate simply as instruments for the reproduction of an oligarchic power.
For me, democracy isn’t a form of power but the very existence of the political (in so far as politics is distinct from knowing who has the right to occupy power or how power should be occupied), precisely because it defines a paradoxical power – one that doesn’t allow anyone legitimately to claim a place on the basis of his or her competences. Democracy is, first of all, a practice, which means that the very same institutions of power may or may not be accompanied by a democratic life. The same forms of parliamentary powers, the same institutional frameworks can either give rise to a democratic life, that is, a subjectivation of the gap between two ways of counting or accounting for the community, or operate simply as instruments for the reproduction of an oligarchic power.
Saturday, 14 January 2012
Democracy, Republic, Representation
by Jacques Rancière, 2006
The democratic scandal consists simply in revealing this: there will never be, under the name of politics, a single principle of community that legitimates the actions of those who govern on the basis of laws inherent in the coming together of human communities. Rousseau was right to denounce the vicious circle of Hobbes, who claimed to prove the natural unsociability of men on the basis of court intrigues and the backbiting of the
salons. But in describing nature according to the model of society, Hobbes also showed that it is vain to look for the origin of political community in some innate virtue of sociability. If the search for origins freely mixes before and after, it is because it always comes after the fact. The philosophy that looks for the principle of good government or the reasons for which men give themselves governments comes after democracy, which
itself comes after, interrupting the ageless logic according to which communities are governed by those who have the right to exercise their authority over those who are predisposed to be subjected to it.
The democratic scandal consists simply in revealing this: there will never be, under the name of politics, a single principle of community that legitimates the actions of those who govern on the basis of laws inherent in the coming together of human communities. Rousseau was right to denounce the vicious circle of Hobbes, who claimed to prove the natural unsociability of men on the basis of court intrigues and the backbiting of the
salons. But in describing nature according to the model of society, Hobbes also showed that it is vain to look for the origin of political community in some innate virtue of sociability. If the search for origins freely mixes before and after, it is because it always comes after the fact. The philosophy that looks for the principle of good government or the reasons for which men give themselves governments comes after democracy, which
itself comes after, interrupting the ageless logic according to which communities are governed by those who have the right to exercise their authority over those who are predisposed to be subjected to it.
Thursday, 17 November 2011
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?
by Jacques Rancière, 2004
What lies behind this strange shift from Man to Humanity and from Humanity to the Humanitarian? The actual subject of these Rights of Man became Human Rights. Is there not a bias in the statement of such rights? It was obviously impossible to revive the Marxist critique. But another form of suspicion could be revived: the suspicion that the ‘‘man’’ of the Rights of Man was a mere abstraction because the only real rights were the rights of citizens, the rights attached to a national community as such.
What lies behind this strange shift from Man to Humanity and from Humanity to the Humanitarian? The actual subject of these Rights of Man became Human Rights. Is there not a bias in the statement of such rights? It was obviously impossible to revive the Marxist critique. But another form of suspicion could be revived: the suspicion that the ‘‘man’’ of the Rights of Man was a mere abstraction because the only real rights were the rights of citizens, the rights attached to a national community as such.
Monday, 12 September 2011
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy
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| Disagreement |
What precisely is at stake in the relationship between “philosophy” and the adjective “political”? In Disagreement, Rancière explores the apparent contradiction between these terms and reveals the uneasy meaning of their union in the phrase “political philosophy”—a juncture related to age-old attempts in philosophy to answer Plato’s devaluing of politics as a “democratic egalitarian” process.
Monday, 5 September 2011
The Philosopher and His Poor
by Jacques Rancière
What has philosophy to do with the poor? If, as has often been supposed, the poor have no time for philosophy, then why have philosophers always made time for them? Why is the history of philosophy—from Plato to Karl Marx to Jean-Paul Sartre to Pierre Bourdieu—the history of so many figures of the poor: plebes, men of iron, the demos, artisans, common people, proletarians, the masses? Why have philosophers made the shoemaker, in particular, a remarkably ubiquitous presence in this history? Does philosophy itself depend on this thinking about the poor? If so, can it ever refrain from thinking for them?
What has philosophy to do with the poor? If, as has often been supposed, the poor have no time for philosophy, then why have philosophers always made time for them? Why is the history of philosophy—from Plato to Karl Marx to Jean-Paul Sartre to Pierre Bourdieu—the history of so many figures of the poor: plebes, men of iron, the demos, artisans, common people, proletarians, the masses? Why have philosophers made the shoemaker, in particular, a remarkably ubiquitous presence in this history? Does philosophy itself depend on this thinking about the poor? If so, can it ever refrain from thinking for them?
Thursday, 1 September 2011
The Ignorant School Master: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation
by Jacques Rancière The book was published in the early 80s as a contribution to a debate happening in France over education. The debate was over the push by the left to make school a nicer, more welcoming and inclusive place for students. A socialist published a book criticising this arguing that schools should be for education, the issue of how students feel in them is secondary. They are only there to be taught and it is on teaching that people should be focused. Against this Ranciere argued that education does not happen through the transference of knowledge from one subject to another. The teacher is not the holder of knowledge. Rather education is a process of self-education. The learner struggles through problem and through that learns.
Saturday, 23 July 2011
Racism: A Passion from Above
by Jacques Rancière, Monthly Review
I'd like to add some reflections on the notion of
"state racism" to our meeting's agenda. These reflections run against a widespread
interpretation of measures that our government has recently taken, from the law
on the veil to the expulsions of the Roma.
This interpretation detects an opportunism that is exploiting racism and
xenophobia for electoral gain. This supposed
critique reinforces the assumption that racism is a popular passion, the
frightened and irrational reaction of retrograde layers of the population, who
can't adapt to the new mobile and cosmopolitan world. The state is accused of failing in its duty
by showing indifference towards these populations. But this accusation only reinforces the
state's position representing itself as the face of rationality vis-à-vis
popular irrationality.
Kristin Ross on Jacques Ranciere
In the spring of 2005 in the village of Cerisy-la-Salle in Normandy, a group of scholars met for three days to celebrate the work of Jacques Ranciere. In France, a colloquium held in one's honor at Cerisy is acknowledgment of a major contribution to philosophical thought, and among the participants were prominent French philosophers: Alain Badiou was a featured speaker, for instance, while Jean-Luc Nancy contributed an essay to the published proceedings. Yet as the weekend progressed, it was clear that what had brought thinkers from Brazil, England, the United States, Greece, and elsewhere to Cerisy was not the need to bear witness to the replacement of one epistemological theory by another, or to celebrate some other step in the development of a specialized science. Cinema, sociology, literature, politics, and aesthetics were all topics of discussion; Heidegger's name, I believe, was never mentioned. This list of fields gives some idea of the range of thinking Ranciere's work has touched and invigorated, but it does not explain the contingencies and detours that have caused him to become, at different moments, a historian, a critic of social science, a philosopher, or a commentator on cinema, on current politics, or, more recently, on contemporary art practices.
Jacques Ranciere and the Subversion of Mastery
by Peter Hallward
Ranciere's most basic assumption is very simple: everyone thinks, everyone speaks. Like many of his philosophical contemporaries, Ranciere further assumes that thought or discourse always proceeds at odds with itself, through forms of creative disjunction or ambivalence which resist any mechanism designed to pin them down or straighten them out. Thinking evades regulation and contests classification. To think is itself to subvert any rigid distribution of classes, places and norms.
Ranciere's most basic assumption is very simple: everyone thinks, everyone speaks. Like many of his philosophical contemporaries, Ranciere further assumes that thought or discourse always proceeds at odds with itself, through forms of creative disjunction or ambivalence which resist any mechanism designed to pin them down or straighten them out. Thinking evades regulation and contests classification. To think is itself to subvert any rigid distribution of classes, places and norms.
Ten Thesis on Politics
Jacques Rancière, Theory & Event, 2001
Thesis 1:
Thesis 1:
Politics is not the exercise of power. Politics ought to be
defined on its own terms, as a mode of acting put into practice by a specific
kind of subject and deriving from a particular form of reason. It is the
political relationship that allows one to think the possibility of a political
subject(ivity) [le sujet politique] not the other way around.
To identify politics with the exercise of, and struggle to
possess, power is to do away with politics. But we also reduce the scope of
politics as a mode of thinking if we conceive of it merely as a theory of power
or as an investigation into the grounds of its legitimacy. If there is
something specific about politics that makes it something other than a more
capacious mode of grouping or a form of power characterized by its mode of
legitimation, it is that it involves a distinctive kind of subject considered,
and it involves this subject in the form of a mode of relation that is its own.
This is what Aristotle means when, in Book I of the Politics, he distinguishes
between political rule (as the ruling of equals) from all other kinds of rule;
or when, in Book III, he defines the citizen as 'he who partakes in the fact of
ruling and the fact of being ruled.' Everything about politics is contained in
this specific relationship, this 'part-taking' [avoir-part],[3] which should be
interrogated as to its meaning and as to its conditions of possibility.
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