It seems more than likely that Jacob Zuma will
be elected President of the African National Congress (ANC) in December, which
will undoubtedly see him remaining President of South Africa for another five
years. What will South Africa look like after ten years of Zuma’s rule? Will
society have become more open, or will growing authoritarianism lead to
democratic spaces being closed down.
In his book The
Democratic Moment - written at the onset of Zuma’s rule - Xolela Mangcu
captured the hope that Zuma's ascent to power would see a shift away from the
elite and intolerant politics of the Thabo Mbeki period, and towards a more
open and responsive 'listening government' that took the grievances of the electorate
seriously, especially the working class and the unemployed.
Certainly, early in Zuma’s presidency, there
were signs that his administration was serious about creating more points of
access to the decision-making system: a key indicator of a more open society.
There is little doubt that Zuma’s promise of a
more open society and polity has, largely, not been realised. In fact, in the
wake of the Marikana massacre, his portrayal as a more responsive president has
come back to mock his hagiographers.
There are many signs that democratic space is
closing up, and that this trend is likely to intensify. While it is difficult
to track changes in the security cluster, as its operations are cloaked in a
shroud of secrecy, there are signs that Zuma is increasing the coercive
capacities of the state.
The level of openness of any society can also be
measured by its level of tolerance of dissenting voices, including protests,
and the increasingly violent policing of protests is the clearest indication of
a shift towards a more repressive state. While protestors often use violent
too, many do so because of the dysfunctional nature of formal communications
channels and in response to police violence.
The remilitarisation of the police has
undoubtedly contributed to the problem of police violence, as has the decision
to deploy paramilitary units, mandated to use maximum force, to police protests.
These harsher methods of protest policing invert previous approaches to protest
policing, where the police were mandated to use minimum force.
In spite of his earlier, more responsive
approach towards protests in ‘hotspots’ like Balfour, more recently Zuma has pledged
to clamp down in illegal protests. Yet on his watch, the police and Municipalities
are making it increasingly impossible for legal protests to take place.
In fact, more Municipalities are using entirely
unlawful reasons to prohibit protests, banking on the fact that many protestors
will not know the contents of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, and will
therefore be unable to defend their rights.
Municipalities have made it increasingly
difficult for protests to take place by tying protestors up in red tape. These
bureaucratic and entirely unlawful measures have included charging protestors
R150 per police officer per hour for the policing of their protests, in the
case of the Emfuleni Municipality.
The Rustenberg Municipality has insisted that
protestors in areas falling under traditional authorities seek the permission
of the chief for their gatherings, and obtain a letter confirming that the
institution that the protest will be held against is willing to accept the
memorandum. The second requirement effectively makes the right to protest
subject to the whim of the protestor’s adversary, who can have the protest
prohibited simply by refusing to accept the memorandum.
In the wake of the Marikana massacre, the Municipality
also prohibited a protest against police violence by the Wonderkop Community
Womens’ Association, because the protest did not have a ‘proper purpose’, which
in effect meant that it would not allow criticism of the police.
According to the Bafokeng Landbuyers’
Association, it has become a nightmare to obtain ‘permission’ for a march in
the platinum belt, which works to the advantage of the mining companies as
dissent against their practices is stifled. In any event, the Act does not
require protestors to seek permission, but merely to notify the local authority
of their intention to protest.
Furthermore, since 2010, evidence has emerged of
the South African Police Service and other levels of government placing unlawful
blanket bans on protests when they feel that state security or the country’s
international image is at stake.
There is no end to the litany of stupid, useless
excuses routinely trotted out by Municipalities for frustrating and even
preventing the right to protest.
It has become increasingly apparent that the
Regulation of Gatherings Act is no longer tenable. The assumption that protest convenors, the Municipality and the police
would be capable of a co-operative relationship in facilitating gatherings, is
a fatal flaw in the Act.
It is inappropriate to make the
ability to exercise a constitutional right contingent on the good conduct of actors
that have a vested interest in not seeing the right being exercised at all.
In this regard, there is a
strong case to be made for decisions about gatherings to be handled by an independent
ombudsman, rather than Municipalities. But the danger is that in the current,
poisoned political climate, if the legislation is reviewed, then the
country may land up with an even worse Act than it already has.
Increasingly, the military are being deployed to
assist the police in the policing of protests. The Ministry of Defence’s 2102
Defence Review has prepared the ground for the increasing domestic deployment
of the military, which makes the creeping militarisation of society more
likely.
What needs to be watched is whether Zuma will
increase political control over the military, given recent examples in North
Africa of armies siding with the people rather than the government in
revolutionary situations. In spite of very significant changes, the latest
iteration of the Protection of State Information Bill will still make it
difficult to obtain the information necessary to analyse the deeper processes
at work in the military.
With regard to the intelligence services, there
is no sign that the Zuma administration is going to act on the recommendations
of the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence (the Matthews Commission),
which proposed measures to prevent the political abuses that happened under
Mbeki. In fact, it has been shelved for the most spurious of reasons, which
makes it more likely that such abuses will recur. This is especially so given
that the intelligence services are being centralised without greater
transparency or public accountability being built into the system.
What went wrong? There can be little doubt that
many in Zuma’s government are genuinely committed to a more substantive
democratic vision that existed under Mbeki, but globally the objective
conditions have not favoured the realisation of this vision.
Zuma came to power at the onset of the global
recession. During periods of economic expansion, capitalism can afford
democracy. This is because the system has the financial means to offer
meaningful reforms to workers to stabilise society, making coercive measures
unnecessary.
But during recessionary periods, society cannot
be held in equilibrium any longer through democratic means, as economic reforms
become less affordable and are reversed, and struggles escalate in response. Fascism
was the political response to this crisis in the 1930’s.
The current crisis is not nearly as severe as
that of the great depression. Governments are responding by securitising the
state to stabilise the system, but within a nominally democratic framework, which
allows a new political class of ‘securocrats’ to gain increasing control over
policy-making, while not descending into full-blown repression. South Africa is
no exception to this general trend.
Then there are pressures that are peculiar to
South Africa. There are signs of the ANC gradually losing electoral support, especially
at local level. But the elite linked to the ANC’s leadership do not have an
independent source of wealth-creation outside the state. Black economic
empowerment has largely failed to transfer wealth from white hands to black
hands. If they lose control of the state, they lose everything. So for reason
of self-preservation, they become desperate to contain dissent and prevent the
establishment of political alternatives, leading to pockets of local level
repression.
In pursuing a path towards a more closed
society, the Zuma administration is sowing the wind. Once the veneer of
legitimacy drops from the state machinery, and it becomes exposed as the law
enforcers of private capital rather than neutral mediators of competing social
forces, then mass revolt, even insurrection, becomes more likely.
Social movement scholars have long recognised
that, far from discouraging protest action, state repression actually
intensifies protest action. This is because the state comes to be seen as
inherently unjust and, in time, illegitimate, leading to strengthened resolve
to struggle against it.
Although there is evidence of greater co-ordination
across strike sites, the current wave of strikes and protests has not coalesced
into a national movement yet. As a result, demands for higher salaries and
better living conditions have not escalated into political demands for a more
just and equal society. But they have the potential to, especially if more
protestors begin to see the Zuma government as being to blame, in part or in
whole, for their miseries.
If these struggles escalate, then society could
be forced open again, and this time not on the terms and conditions of the
ruling elite. In this regard, no matter how grim the current period seems, it
is also pregnant with great promise.
