Showing posts with label Human Rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Human Rights. Show all posts
Friday, 27 December 2013
Tuesday, 12 November 2013
Tuesday, 23 July 2013
Is a commitment to human rights sufficient for an emancipatory theoretical praxis?
by
Kayla Hazell
“They didn’t ask us why we are washing
cars. They didn’t ask us anything.”
This essay adopts the position
that formal human rights, such as those encoded in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter, the
Constitution), are potentially emancipatory in the sense that they embody our
society’s commitments and aspirations with regard to the treatment of
individuals and groups. That said, it will be argued that a formal commitment
to human rights does not automatically translate into practice and that this
has largely been the South African experience. Human rights are subject to
constant balancing, particularly where interests conflict, and such balancing
occurs according to a particular rationality. It will be contended that, if
rights are to become a reality for all, the rationality governing our
commitment to human rights in South Africa, currently largely economistic, will
need to be renegotiated in light of the fact that our formal rights have stood
watch while extreme inequality continues.
Thursday, 13 June 2013
Is a commitment to human rights sufficient for an emancipatory praxis?
by Owona Madlingozi
Seyla
Benhabib (Hoover, 2013: 3) “defends human rights as universal moral
norms…which…define the equal concern and recognition due to every individual in
that process of communicative reasoning”. This essay aims to analyse human
rights, the purpose they serve and how they have been used in modern society.
It aims to look at practical situations and see how effectively human rights
have been used in society and to what extent they have complemented
emancipation. It serves to show that human rights are not sufficient for an
emancipatory theoretical praxis. In describing emancipation, we find that it
needs to be a part of popular politics, an essentially human based experience.
A commitment to human rights cannot be sufficient if it does not ensure that
those very rights can completely be realised. Without the commitment to actual
individual realisation, human rights can never be sufficient for an
emancipatory praxis.
Sunday, 26 May 2013
The truth about rights in South Africa
By
Iqbal Suleman, Thought Leader
Rights
ranging from access to land to access to justice are entrenched in
our Constitution. These rights are presumed to be available and
readily accessible to everyone. The Constitution tells us that we all
have equal rights but the reality shows us otherwise. In a free
market economy, nothing is really free. From access to housing,
healthcare, education and justice. It all has a price. If you cannot
afford it, you cannot access it. What do you
mean justice is inaccessible and market driven, you hear neo-liberals
cry. There are human-rights NGOs, legal aid, university law clinics
and pro bono attorneys. It remains unsure, though, how many people
are able access these mainly urban-centred, rights-based
organisations and what capacity these organisations have.
Sunday, 21 April 2013
From May 2008 to 2011: Xenophobic Violence and National Subjectivity in South Africa
by Judith Hayem, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2013
This
article examines the recurrence of xenophobic attacks in 2011 in the
light of the events of May 2008. Using archives and secondary data,
examining slogans and discourses heard at the time and reflecting on
the author’s own involvement as an activist alongside foreign
residents displaced by the 2008 attacks, it is argued that the
xenophobic attacks demonstrated a shift in the national subjectivity
or conception of citizenship, from an inclusive notion implying
participation in the future South African society to a dialectical
representation of nationals against foreigners. It is further argued
that, in its mismanagement of the 2008 crisis, the South African
government contributed to the emergence of such attitudes and did
nothing to stop the violence; hence its repetition. The notion of
human rights that has emerged in South Africa is one of the keys to
an understanding of the representations at stake: whereas human
rights used to be a universal and founding notion in post-apartheid
South Africa, they are now seen as a national privilege regarding
access to basic needs. The article shows that the humanitarian
management of the May 2008 crisis by the South African Government
contributed considerably to obscuring the notion of ‘human rights’.
In order to oppose such a dangerous policy, there is an urgent need
to revive the political debate in South Africa.
Saturday, 31 March 2012
Reflections on Human Rights Discourse and Emancipation in Africa in the Twenty-first Century
by Michael Neocosmos, Solidarity Peace Trust, Zimbabwe (undated)
At the very time when it most often mouths the word, the West has never been further from being able to live a true humanism – a humanism made to the measure of the world (Aimé Césaire).Whoever is engaged in popular struggles for democratic emancipation in Africa today is confronted with an immediate problem concerning human rights. While on the one hand a discourse of rights is seemingly necessary for thinking democratisation, given that the state regularly flouts these, on the other human rights seem to refer to a discourse mainly propounded by neo-liberal interests whether local or foreign. Several repressive regimes in Africa and elsewhere (Zimbabwe, Sudan, maybe Cote D’Ivoire, Iran) oppose a discourse of nationalism to one on human rights. As an activist, one finds oneself in a seemingly irresolvable discursive contradiction between human (predominantly individual) rights and national (or group or identity) rights. At times this contradiction is central to government itself. For exampling in Thabo Mbeki’s South African government, a central contradiction appeared in the form of a commitment to neo-liberal conceptions of rights on the one hand along with a sensitivity to national and racial oppression in Africa on the other. This was reflected in government reactions to a number of different issues including Zimbabwe. In fact this contradiction is arguably constitutive of the subjectivity of the new South African bourgeoisie itself. On the one hand their private accumulation is premised on an adherence to neo-liberal precepts including human rights, on the other a sensitivity to racism and to a lesser extent to Western hegemony in African affairs is also evident. The manner in which the vagaries of this contradiction were navigated explains much regarding Mbeki’s presidency (Neocosmos, 2002).
Friday, 16 December 2011
Transition, human rights and violence: rethinking a liberal political relationship in the African neo-colony
by Michael Neocosmos, Interface, 2011
Rather than seeing the prevalence of systemic political violence in Africa as resulting from a purportedly difficult “transition to democracy”, this article insists that accounts of such violence must be sought within the modes of rule of the democratic state itself. In particular, the manifestation of a contradiction between democracy and nationalism in a neo-colonial context, takes many different forms which cannot be resolved consensually given
existing modes of rule and the enrichment of the oligarchy at the expense of the nation. Xenophobic violence in South Africa is used to illustrate the argument. It is shown that a distinction between domains of politics (including modes of rule) must be drawn. In particular, this means distinguishing between a domain of “civil society” and one of “uncivil society”. It is within the latter that most people relate and respond to state power. Within that domain, the state does not rule people as citizens with legally enforceable rights, but simply as a population with various entitlements. In this domain, violent political practices by the state tend to be the norm rather than the exception, so that violence acquires a certain amount of legitimacy for resolving contradictions among people. The overcoming of systemic violence (itself a political choice) can only begin to be conceived via a different thought of politics as subjective practice.
Rather than seeing the prevalence of systemic political violence in Africa as resulting from a purportedly difficult “transition to democracy”, this article insists that accounts of such violence must be sought within the modes of rule of the democratic state itself. In particular, the manifestation of a contradiction between democracy and nationalism in a neo-colonial context, takes many different forms which cannot be resolved consensually given
existing modes of rule and the enrichment of the oligarchy at the expense of the nation. Xenophobic violence in South Africa is used to illustrate the argument. It is shown that a distinction between domains of politics (including modes of rule) must be drawn. In particular, this means distinguishing between a domain of “civil society” and one of “uncivil society”. It is within the latter that most people relate and respond to state power. Within that domain, the state does not rule people as citizens with legally enforceable rights, but simply as a population with various entitlements. In this domain, violent political practices by the state tend to be the norm rather than the exception, so that violence acquires a certain amount of legitimacy for resolving contradictions among people. The overcoming of systemic violence (itself a political choice) can only begin to be conceived via a different thought of politics as subjective practice.
Thursday, 17 November 2011
Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?
by Jacques Rancière, 2004
What lies behind this strange shift from Man to Humanity and from Humanity to the Humanitarian? The actual subject of these Rights of Man became Human Rights. Is there not a bias in the statement of such rights? It was obviously impossible to revive the Marxist critique. But another form of suspicion could be revived: the suspicion that the ‘‘man’’ of the Rights of Man was a mere abstraction because the only real rights were the rights of citizens, the rights attached to a national community as such.
What lies behind this strange shift from Man to Humanity and from Humanity to the Humanitarian? The actual subject of these Rights of Man became Human Rights. Is there not a bias in the statement of such rights? It was obviously impossible to revive the Marxist critique. But another form of suspicion could be revived: the suspicion that the ‘‘man’’ of the Rights of Man was a mere abstraction because the only real rights were the rights of citizens, the rights attached to a national community as such.
Monday, 5 September 2011
Prisoners of Freedom Human Rights and the African Poor
In this vivid ethnography, Harri Englund investigates how ideas of
freedom impede struggles against poverty and injustice in emerging
democracies. Reaching beyond a narrow focus on the national elite, Prisoners of Freedom shows
how foreign aid and human rights activism hamper the pursuit of
democratic citizenship in Africa. The book explores how activists’
aspirations of self-improvement, pursued under harsh economic
conditions, find in the human rights discourse a new means to
distinguish oneself from the poor masses.
Among expatriates, the emphasis on abstract human rights avoids confrontations with the political and business elites. Drawing on long-term research among the Malawian poor, Englund brings to life the personal circumstances of Malawian human rights activists, their expatriate benefactors, and the urban and rural poor as he develops a fresh perspective on freedom—one that recognizes the significance of debt, obligation, and civil virtues.
Among expatriates, the emphasis on abstract human rights avoids confrontations with the political and business elites. Drawing on long-term research among the Malawian poor, Englund brings to life the personal circumstances of Malawian human rights activists, their expatriate benefactors, and the urban and rural poor as he develops a fresh perspective on freedom—one that recognizes the significance of debt, obligation, and civil virtues.
Tuesday, 30 August 2011
Transition, Human Rights and Violence: rethinking a liberal political relationship in the African neo-colony
by Michael Neocosmos, Critical Studies Seminar, Rhodes University, 31 August 2011
The courage, inventiveness and organisation of the people of North Africa in Tunisia and Egypt, as the new year of 2011 was turning, have evidently disproved (if refutation were needed) the thesis of „the end of history‟. In doing so they have provided renewed enthusiasm for 'people power' and a popularly driven process of mass mobilisation in which people can not only force the resignation of dictators and seemingly the (partial or full) collapse of authoritarian states, but crucially also demand a greater say in the running of their own lives. In standing up against oppression in this manner, people have asserted that they are no longer victims but full blown political subjects. Yet the appearance of the masses on such a broad scale on the political scene for the first time since independence cannot be assumed to mean that they will remain there, and not only because coercive military power has yet to be transformed.
The courage, inventiveness and organisation of the people of North Africa in Tunisia and Egypt, as the new year of 2011 was turning, have evidently disproved (if refutation were needed) the thesis of „the end of history‟. In doing so they have provided renewed enthusiasm for 'people power' and a popularly driven process of mass mobilisation in which people can not only force the resignation of dictators and seemingly the (partial or full) collapse of authoritarian states, but crucially also demand a greater say in the running of their own lives. In standing up against oppression in this manner, people have asserted that they are no longer victims but full blown political subjects. Yet the appearance of the masses on such a broad scale on the political scene for the first time since independence cannot be assumed to mean that they will remain there, and not only because coercive military power has yet to be transformed.
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