This essay serves to discuss what would be
required of a theoretical practice for it to be premised on a genuine
commitment to universal equality. I will argue, in line with Jacques Ranciere
(2006), that for this to be achieved a theoretical practice has to start from
the point of equality, a genuine equality in which each and every human being
is respected in being able to think and act for themselves. The point of
departure of this theoretical practice has to be equality of every human being,
equality of intelligence and status. Therefore, such a principled theory would
have to form part of an emancipatory political project, which arguably can only
be realised though a genuine commitment to universal equality. Furthermore, for
this equality to be truly universal it has to be part of a dialectical approach
which is premised in theory that is specific as opposed to singular.
Before
this can be discussed and explained at length, one must look at the failings of
current and past theoretical practice and deduce that, whether it has been
along lines of class, race or gender, distinctions have been made that have not
allowed for a genuine equality to be realised. Here one can consider the
problems that Lewis Gordon (2006) brings to light in terms of theoretical practice
falling into the web of theodician tendencies which allow people to be
problematized as opposed to being viewed as people with problems. In addition
attention must also be given to the the current inequality of class embedded in
the concept of civil society and the problem of the dominance of oligarchy
masquerading as democracy in identifying the current shortcomings of
theoretical practice as it stands. I will argue here, in line with Gordon
(2006), that we need to “shift the geography of reason” in which these
distinctions have been normalised in order to start from a point of a genuine
universal which is premised on equality. We must also look at the concept of
“disciplinary decadence” (Gordon, 2006: 32) and how this needs to be avoided to
achieve a theoretical practice which is based on a genuine commitment to
universal equality. It is after such considerations that efforts to identify a
genuine concept of universal equality can be made and, and from this point of
departure we can procure a theoretical practice that is premised on a genuine
commitment to universal equality.
Throughout history people have been classified
according to “degrees of humanity… (in which) some humans were more than
others,” (Trouillot, 1995: 76). This can be seen specifically in the historical
events of slavery, colonialism and apartheid in which race was legitimised as a
classificatory distinction. This distinction has perpetuated the notion that
black people are not the same as white people and therefore should not have access
to the same equal basic rights. It has perpetuated an inequality in which "The standard view is that things
white represent universality and things black are locked in the web of
particularity," (Gordon, 2006:8). This claim advocates that whiteness has
been normalised as the universal, while that which is black is singular as it
has been placed in a location which is “outside the system of order and
rationality,” (Gordon, 2006: 7). This racialised logic has been prevalent in
theoretical practice throughout history, and even though racial distinctions in
terms of humanity and equality have been denounced worldwide and proven to hold
no weight, this reasoning still persists in much contemporary theoretical
practice.
This reasoning
has been legitimated though secularized theodicy in current theoretical
practices (Gordon, 2006). This is theodicy in which a secular theory has the
same logic of theology in that the system has been presented as that which has
no flaws and thus the people must be the problem. Gordon claims that :
“in the context of modern attitudes and political treatment towards black folks, a special kind of theodician grammar has asserted itself. The appeal to blacks as problem-people is an assertion of their ultimate location outside the system of order and rationality… blacks become rationalised as the extraneous evil of a just system,” (2006: 7).
The relevance of
this is that much theory has been written which looks at people as the problem,
not the system. This can be seen currently in America, as people try to
theorise about why the majority of prisoners are African-American men. Black
people, rather than the system, are seen as the problem. Instead Gordon (2006:
6) advocates that we need to study people as human beings and “find a way to
study black people without black people becoming problems in themselves”. Thus,
we need to move away from this theodician logic in theoretical practice to
start from a point of genuine equality which is universal in nature.
While the
classificatory distinction of race have been shown to hold no weight, the
distinction of class has become the most prevalent in current neo-liberal,
‘democratic’ society. Partha
Chatterjee (2004) argues that the formal structure of the democratic
nation-state, which has come to be regarded as the standard political form of
the modern world and is premised on the equality and freedom of citizens,
imagines a broad conception of civil society, (25). The guarantee of equal
citizenship rights to all members of the nation state permits the constitution
and laws of the state to officially recognise that “all of society is civil
society,” (Chatterjee, 2004: 38). In line with this, every citizen has the
capacity to exert their will in the process of political deliberation and
negotiation that transpires between the state and civil society (Chatterjee,
2004: 38).
However, in practice this is not the case.
Rather, most citizens are excluded from the process of political deliberation
and negotiation that results in the determining of state policies. Instead,
most citizens (those who are not elite) have been regarded not as full, right
bearing citizens. Rather, they are treated as passive, apolitical subjects in
need of ‘service delivery’ as is the case in South Africa. This majority are then
excluded from the benefits of being part of civil society but still have to
bear the consequences of being within a political society. Thus, civil society
has been restricted to a small section of culturally equipped citizens
representing the high ground of modernity, namely, the elite, (Chaterjee,
2004). This argument put forward by Chaterjee is very evident in the current
day political situation in South Africa. Elites of political parties control
the political agenda while the majority of South Africans, who repeatedly
attempt in the form of popular protest to influence the political agenda, are
not acknowledged as legitimate participants in civil society, and thus are
reduced to unreasonable, unthinking barbarians.
This can be seen in the recent case of the
Marikana Massacre, which took place in Rustenburg on the 16th of
August 2012, in which 34 Lonmin platinum miners were gunned down by the South
African police during a strike in which they were demanding a living wage. This
complete disregard for the humanity of the poor shows their exclusion from
civil society due to their lower status in terms of class. Furthermore, the
dehumanisation of these miners in the eyes of the media and the state show the
inequality inherent in current state policy and practices. Once again a
theodician logic is being applied in which the people are problematized as
opposed to the system, namely the colonial mentality that remains in the South
African mining business (and state as a whole), perpetuated by the fundamentally
classist nature of neo-liberal policy. This is significant precisely because we
are currently operating within a system that incorrectly claims to be based on
equality.
The consequences of Chatterjee’s claims about
the true nature of civil society for theoretical practice are that we need to
acknowledge that elites have become the representative trustees of the will of
the people. Accordingly, this has resulted in the silencing of the voices of
ordinary people so that they are excluded from the national political process
(Chatterjee, 2004). For a theoretical practice to be premised on a genuine
commitment to universal equality we need to acknowledge this inherent
inequality and make a point of rectifying it by starting from a point of genuine equality in which every person is
respected on an equal basis above all else. An effort needs to be made to break
down the debilitating distinctions of race, class and gender within theoretical
practice to reach a point of genuine universal equality.
This problematic notion of civil society that
Chaterjee (2004) brings to light is part of a larger problem that Ranciere
(2006) brings to bear, the problem of rights being enshrined in the nation
through the notion of citizenship. The fundamental problem of the “duality of
man (sic) and citizen” is that if two principles are required for politics
instead of one there must be some “deceit or vice” at the heart of this dual
logic, (Ranciere, 2006: 58). It is this deceit which is at the centre of the
politics of the nation state as “the rights of man are either empty or
tautological. They are the rights of bare man; but bare man, the man who
belongs to no constituted national community, has no rights. The rights of man,
then, are the empty rights of those who have no rights,” (Ranciere, 2006: 58).
This deep-seated obstruction to the realisation of a true and universal
equality within theoretical practice and current political systems needs to be
acknowledged and rectified. Citizenship has hollowed out the concept of rights
and made them exclusionary which points to the need to start from a point of
genuine equality. For a theoretical practice to be premised on a genuine
commitment to universal equality we need to develop a notion of rights that is
not exclusionary and tautological, one that is dedicated to a true realisation
of equality of every human being.
Discussion now
turns to the problems of “disciplinary decadence” (Gordon, 2006: 32) within theoretical practices and how this needs to be
avoided in order for a theoretical practice to be premised on a genuine
commitment to universal equality. Gordon (2006) criticises many disciplines and
the theory founding them in that they are narrow and collapse in on themselves
because they are not wholly inclusive. “This phenomenon is the error of
disciplinary reductionism. It involves ontologizing one’s discipline –
literally, collapsing “the world” into one’s disciplinary perspective” (Gordon,
2006: 33). What needs to be taken into
account in a theoretical practice that is committed to a genuine universal of
equality is that human reality is all encompassing; hence, we cannot see it
through one particular lens such as one discipline, as each discipline in
isolation is too limited in scope (Gordon, 2006). Therefore, contemporary
theory needs to be more encompassing and inclusive if it is to be premised on
genuine notion of universal equality.
Archives of theoretical
practice have traditionally been elite spaces in which white, western theory
has dominated. We need to move away from this to achieve a theoretical practice
which is founded on a genuine commitment to universal equality. This can be
done through such projects as Subaltern Studies which seek to tell the politics
of those marginalised, to articulate a real politics of the people (Guha,
1997). Gordon (2006) also advocates that this can be done by looking at theory
from the “underside of modernity.” W.E.B Du Bois idea of ‘double consciousness’
can be inverted here in that when you are aware of the limits of dominant
theory you have a second lens in which
to understand life (cited in Gordon, 2006). Through integrating and including
the perspectives of everyone, poor or rich, white or black, male or female, we
can move toward achieving a theoretical practice which is premised on a genuine
commitment to universal equality, which takes as its starting point, equality.
It is now time to
discuss in depth how the geography of reason should be shifted in a achieving a
theoretical practice that is premised on genuine commitment to universal
equality. As I have mentioned before, I believe that this has to be done
through starting from the point of equality above all else. For this to be
achieved we need to recognise the ability of every human to think and act with
intelligence. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the former president of Haiti, puts this
concept beautifully saying, “tout moun se moun – every person is indeed a person,
every person is capable of thinking things through for themselves,” (cited in
Hallward, 2007: 13). We need to
acknowledge the “open door of every consciousness” (Fanon cited in Sekyi-Out, 2001: 49) and give every human an equal opportunity to be the masters
of their own destiny. We need to value the humanity of all people regardless of
race, class and gender and this should be the starting point for any
theoretical practice if it is to be based on a genuine commitment to universal
equality.
For this
theoretical practice to be truly universal, however, it has to move away from
the singular notion of theory in which experience is deemed unique and
therefore cannot be related to other situations (Hallward, 2004). This type of
theory is locked in a web of particularity in which experiences cannot be
connected, writers of this singular theory end up writing about themselves in a
narcissistic manner and the experience is not relational and therefore cannot
be applied on a universal scale. Rather, we need theory that is produced from
the viewpoint of the specific if it is to be universal in nature. This type of
specific theory acknowledges that experience happens in a particular context in
a particular way, but it can be understood and explained to others in a
relational manner (Hallward, 2004). Fanonian theory has been produced in this
manner and while much of it is based on Fanon’s own experiences during the
Algerian Revolution, it can be applied worldwide because it is not wrapped up
in the web of particularity. For a theoretical practice to be truly universal
it has to be produced from the viewpoint of the specific in which we
acknowledge the particular but in such a way that it can be related on a larger
scale to other events that occur around the world. I believe that this calls
for a dialect approach to theoretical practice which “moves from the concrete and gives
content to the universal (namely, human freedom) as it emerges from the
particular” (Gibson, 2011: 15).
As Ranciere
(2006) argues we need to move away from the Platonic, totalitarian idea that
all people have their place, with the gold philosophers at the top, the silver
soldiers and warriors in the middle and the bronze workers at the bottom of
society (Russell, 1996: 111). This idea links with the Leninist view that we
need the vanguard elite to lead the people to their revolution and freedom.
Such a view is flawed precisely because every individual has the capacity and
intellect to realise their own freedom and take it. This view is more consistent
with, and enables one to distinguish a genuine theory of universal equality.
Thus, we should take a Maoist approach and realise that the grassroots do not
need intellectuals to lead them, instead every person should be viewed as
having the competence to realise their own power and capability to be the
masters of their own destiny. An example of the inherent capability we have
within us all regardless of status and opportunity can be seen in the case S’bu
Zikode, the elected president of Abahlali baseMjondolo. Zikode grew up in a
small village in South Africa with little education. He was a petrol attendant
and security guard and eventually came to live in a shack settlement in Durban.
Going by Plato’s measure of society Zikode would fall under the bronze, bottom
sector of society. However, Zikode is now writing important influential
philosophy as an active intellect. The same can be said of Ayanda Kota of the
Unemployed People’s Movement in Grahamstown. These two examples are significant
in that these two people, from an apparent bronze status, have proven to be
intellectuals in their own right. Thus, contemporary theory must acknowledge
the intellect, voice and opinion of everyone as equal in attempting to be
premised on a genuine commitment to universal equality.
The Haitian
Revolution, which took place in St. Domingue from 1701 to 1804, provides a
clear example of the value of starting from a point of equality. The Haitian
Revolution occurred in a time in which it was a completely “unthinkable” event
in human history (Trouillot, 1995: 72). This revolution challenged not only the
Western institution of slavery but the very idea of man as it was defined at
the time. It stretched the radical universalism of the French Revolution,
extending it beyond what was thinkable. The Haitian revolution threatened the
ontological and political assumptions of the most radical writers of the
Enlightenment; “it challenged the conceptual framework of its time” (Trouillot,
1995: 82). This revolution took place in time in which the idea of black slaves
organising themselves and revolting, resulting in the abolition of slavery, the
recognition of the black person as a human being ontologically equal to the
white man, and the creation of the first independent black state, defied all
discourse. This revolution was so poignant and radical precisely because it was
premised on the notion of universal equality. Using equality as their starting
point the Haitian slaves never let their ideal slip from the agenda. In doing
so, they were able to achieve freedom in an unthinkable manner. It is with this
sort of determination for the recognition of a genuine equality that
contemporary theoretical practices need to pursue. Only through starting from
this position of absolute, undeniable and genuine equality can we premise any
theoretical practice that is to achieve true emancipation of all people from
the constraints of our current unequal and unjust society.
In conclusion, it can be seen that theoretical
practices need to become wholly inclusive we are to achieve a genuine
commitment to universal equality. This has to be done through the breaking down
of the current distinctions of race, class and gender which characterise our
contemporary situation in order to achieve a genuine equality which can be
universal in nature. By starting from the point of equality it becomes a means
to an end and allows for each and every person to be the masters of their own
destiny. Moreover, theoretical practice
needs to be produced from a relational, specific approach that is dialectic in
nature for it to be a genuine universal. By recognising the humanity of every
person a theoretical practice can be produced that is truly premised on a
genuine commitment to universal equality.
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